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Introduction
A replication device (RD) is any device that reproduces (e.g., copies, prints, scans) documents, images, or objects from an electronic or physical source. For the purposes of this NISTIR, RDs include copiers, printers, three-dimensional (3D) printers, scanners, 3D scanners, as well as multifunction machines when used as a copier, printer, or scanner. RDs in use within organizations run the gamut in terms of age and functionality. Older, single-function devices may have no internal, nonvolatile storage and cannot be networked. Other devices may provide a variety of functions, be network-connected, run commercially available operating systems, contain internal, nonvolatile storage, and contain embedded internal print servers and web server capability. In between the two extremes, there may be RDs with network and/or storage functionality but no discernable means to configure them securely. Additionally, many organizations may not have an accurate inventory of RDs or recognize what functionality each device possesses, especially with respect to information (data) storage, processing, and transmission.
Managing the risks associated with RDs requires a basic understanding of threats, vulnerabilities, potential impact and likelihood of an event, and the identification and implementation of countermeasures or mitigation strategies. This publication provides guidance on protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information processed, stored, or transmitted on RDs.
Background
Historically, the capabilities of RDs were limited to basic copying, scanning, and printing. Storage of scanned or printed information within the RDs was not part of the device functionality and RDs were locally (directly) connected to computers via a cable or were stand-alone devices so the security of information processed by RDs was generally not a consideration for most organizations. Today, however, RDs are often connected to organizational networks, have central processing units that run common commercial operating systems, store information internally on nonvolatile storage media, and may even have internal servers or routers. As a result, RDs may be vulnerable to a number of exploits if the risk is not mitigated using appropriate security practices/controls.
Purpose and Applicability
RDs are found throughout most organizations and are components included in many information systems. This document provides a brief discussion of vulnerabilities and exploits associated with RDs and provides a set of security practices/controls that can be implemented to mitigate risks.
All RDs are within the scope of this document, including multifunction devices or software applications for using tablets or cell phones as copiers/scanners, but the guidance in this document is only applicable to the copy/print/scan functions of those devices. Other functions, such as email, web server, or faxing capabilities, are mentioned only as they relate to the security of the copy/print/scan functions.
Target Audience
This publication serves individuals responsible for the purchase, installation, configuration, maintenance, disposition, and security of RDs including:
 Individuals with acquisition responsibilities;  Individuals with system administration responsibilities;
 Individuals with information system and security control assessment and monitoring responsibilities; and  Individuals with information security implementation and operational responsibilities.
This publication assumes the target audience has a working knowledge of information technology and information security terms and best practices. For definitions of unfamiliar terms, please see NIST IR 7298, Glossary of Key Information Security Terms.
Document Structure
This publication is structured as follows:
 Section 2 describes potential threats and vulnerabilities;
 Section 3 presents considerations to help identify potential risk mitigation strategies.
 Appendix A is a glossary of key terms.
 Appendix B provides a means to help conduct a risk analysis on RDs using an example template.
 Appendix C defines key roles and responsibilities for conducting a risk assessment on RDs.
Threats and Vulnerabilities
RDs may be vulnerable to multiple threat vectors that can be used to compromise organizational information or disrupt the device. Appendix B of this document provides a template for analyzing vulnerabilities and determining the risk associated with a RD.
General Threats and Vulnerabilities
The following are general threats, vulnerabilities, and related exploits that may affect RDs:
 Default administration/configuration password: Many devices have default passwords which can be easily obtained and used to access configuration panels, stored data, or to control the device locally or remotely via a web interface.
 Data capture: When data is transmitted or stored unencrypted, it is subject to interception. This data may include device passwords, configuration settings, or processed jobs. Such data may appear to be unreadable but is an exploitable vulnerability if it is not encrypted.
 Disruption of service: RDs may be susceptible to a variety of threats which disrupt the availability of services. User interfaces, power consumption, and internal mechanical and software operations may be especially vulnerable.
 Spam: Most RDs, if not properly configured, will process any submitted job, without regard to the originator, without confirmation that the job is authorized, and without authentication. If exploited, this vulnerability may waste ink, paper, toner, or other materials while also resulting in a denial of service for legitimate users.
 Alteration/corruption of data: Exploits of this nature may be very difficult to detect, but could result in reduced quality, a denial of service (for example, if a password is altered), or a potentially hazardous situation (for example, if configuration settings are altered to allow the device to overheat).
 Outdated and/or unpatched operating systems and firmware: Many RDs run an embedded commercial operating system which renders them subject to the same threats and vulnerabilities as any other computing device running those same operating systems. To complicate matters, RD manufacturers may embed versions of operating systems for which the operating system provider is no longer providing updates or the functionality to install patches or updates is not available. Buffer overflows, execution of arbitrary code, and taking control of the device using remote administration capabilities via web server/site are but a few examples of exploits to which RDs with unpatched operating systems and firmware are vulnerable.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Vulnerability Database (nvd.nist.gov) lists many specific vulnerabilities that affect RDs produced by multiple manufacturers. The impact of a compromise depends on the information the device handles or processes as well as the capabilities of the device. A compromise may affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of both the device and the information it processes, stores, or transmits. For example, while confidentiality of the information processed may be a primary concern with regard to a small device used to copy personally identifiable information, integrity of the device may be a greater concern with regard to a 3D printer which uses metal powders to create marketing materials. When evaluating risk associated with a RD and determining what countermeasures are appropriate for the device, it is important to understand its intended use and capabilities as well as the impact levels of the information to be processed, stored, or transmitted. See FIPS 199 and NIST SP 800-60 for more information on impact levels and information types.
Network Connectivity Threats and Vulnerabilities
Many threats and vulnerabilities are related to network connectivity. Connecting RDs to organizational networks is convenient and may be more cost-effective than each individual user having a locally connected device. Cost savings may also be realized by allowing users to manage, access, and monitor a device from a distance. However, with network connectivity comes greater risk of exposing the device, information, and any connected systems to threats. Some potential threats, vulnerabilities, and related exploits associated with network connectivity include:
 Unencrypted information: Unencrypted information is subject to unauthorized exposure and modification. Any information, including configuration data or passwords, sent unencrypted to a RD could be intercepted, exposed, and/or altered.
 Open ports/protocols: Open ports and protocols allow data to flow to and from a device. When unused ports/protocols are not disabled, attackers may be able to access a machine undetected. Repudiation issues (e.g., removing origination information from file metadata, deleting entries from usage logs), data tampering, exposure of management consoles, network bouncing (hiding the source of a user's network connection), information disclosure, or denial of service are some of the associated potential security incidents.
 Denial of service (DoS): RDs connected to the Internet may be more vulnerable to this threat which results in devices being temporarily unusable.
 Wireless connectivity: Wireless functionality allows communications via Bluetooth or 802.11 to other devices or with the Internet. As with wired RDs, if not encrypted, these communications may potentially be intercepted.
 Access permissions: Anyone with the necessary equipment and access can potentially compromise a RD. Some RDs allow remote access for automatic updates, configuration changes, or maintenance. If access is not controlled or automatic downloads verified, this capability could be used to install malware or rootkits, gain access to other areas of the network, compromise configuration settings including passwords, disable a device, or expose stored information.
 Botnets: RDs' memory and processing power may be used as part of DoS botnets to attack organizational assets on the same network and/or the assets of external organizations.
 Hop/Relay Points: RDs that have been compromised may be used to reach other organizational assets on the same network or to conceal the actual point of origin of an attack on external networks.
Nonvolatile Storage Media Threats and Vulnerabilities
Many RDs use nonvolatile storage media to manage jobs and control the device. Potentially all of the information that was ever processed, stored, or transmitted by the device could remain in the nonvolatile storage indefinitely. Nonvolatile storage media for RDs is most often in the form of a hard disk drive or solid state drive. 1 Some RDs may also provide for use of removable solid state memory cards or flash drives. Information stored within a RD may leave organizational information vulnerable to numerous exploits and compromises of confidentiality or integrity. Some potential threats, vulnerabilities, and related exploits associated with storage media include:
 Unencrypted information: Any information stored unencrypted on a RD could be exposed and/or modified by anyone with access (including maintenance personnel) or in the event of a successful network-based attack.
 Sanitization: Information could be retrieved by unauthorized personnel when the RD or nonvolatile storage media is disposed, warehoused, or repurposed.
 Access: External maintenance or other personnel given physical or remote access to the RD could download or copy stored information. Removable storage media (e.g. memory cards or flash drives) may be especially vulnerable to exploits involving theft or alteration/corruption of data.
 Unauthorized Storage: RDs that have been compromised may be used to store unauthorized data in memory. Such data has typically been illegally obtained (e.g., copyrighted data, intellectual property).
Risk Management Activities throughout the SDLC
It is important to consider information security in each stage of the system development life cycle 2 and build security in at the earliest stages possible. In order to manage risks associated with RDs, it is important to consider the capabilities and security functionality of the device along with the security posture, system/information impact levels, and risk tolerance of the organization when identifying appropriate devices to acquire. The following sections contain basic steps to help organizations identify and implement appropriate risk management strategies.
Initiation
During the Initiation Phase, determine how the device will be used. Key questions to consider include:  Who will use the device and where will it be located?  Will the device be connected to a network?  What is the impact level (i.e., low, moderate, or high as defined in FIPS 199) of the information to be processed, stored, and/or transmitted by the device?
 What kinds of capabilities (e.g., high-capacity, network connection, ability to handle special materials) are needed for the device to perform its intended functions?
 Will the device be purchased or leased?
 What security controls are needed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of both the device and the information to be processed, stored, and/or transmitted by the device at the appropriate impact level?
 What device functionality is needed to support security requirements and provide security at the appropriate impact level?
 Does the organization want or need a service contract for the device? How much control does the organization have over the terms of the service agreement (e.g., can the organization independently vet service technicians?)
 What skills/personnel are needed to install, configure, manage, maintain, and secure the device?
 Will the staff require training on how to install, configure, manage, maintain, and secure the device?
Include the owner and/or end user(s) of the device as well as information technology and security staff in the initiation process. There will likely be several areas where there may be some flexibility or uncertainty depending on the device chosen for acquisition. Document these areas for use during the development/acquisition phase.
Development/Acquisition
During the Development/Acquisition Phase, the organization investigates and considers available security options with respect to how the device will be used, as described in the previous phase. During this phase, several options may be weighed and alternatives chosen based on both security and functionality requirements as well as cost.
When security options are not available, compensating security controls may be required to ensure security at the appropriate level. 3 For example, if a device does not have a space for a chain or cord for physical protection, placing the device in a secure area may suffice. If implementation of compensating controls is not feasible, the organization considers whether a gap between the security functions offered by the device and the security functions needed to meet security requirements is a risk that is acceptable to the organization.
Some security functions to consider include:
 Editable configuration settings 4 ;
 Secure configuration provided by the manufacturer;
 Image overwrite capability;
 Physical protection capability (e.g., ability to be bolted to the floor or secured with a chain and padlock);
 Physical protection for nonvolatile storage media (e.g., requires a lock to access the hard drive);
 Ability to maintain the RD by internal staff and/or maintenance support throughout its expected life span (including software patches, replacement parts, etc.);  Ability to encrypt information while in transmission or storage (including passwords, configuration settings, and user files);
 Activity monitoring with alerts/triggers (e.g., automatically block suspicious activity);
 Audit record (event logging) capability;
 Authentication capabilities (e.g., password/pin, smart card, proximity badge);
 Access control levels/roles (e.g., administrative/privileged access, user access);
 Ability to configure network/port settings;
 Tamper evident solutions (e.g., anti-lift ink, copy-void pantograph); and  Automatic safety shutdown (e.g., when overheating).
Inspect the device for defects, delivery errors (e.g., wrong version), and malware before accepting delivery. Once acquired, include networked/wireless RDs and those with nonvolatile storage in the associated system security plan. Document device information, supply chain (e.g., distributer) information, default and customized configuration settings, security/usage policies, and any other information related to the acquisition and security requirements of the device.
Implementation
Before placing the device into operation, configure the RD securely and implement appropriate security controls. There are numerous secure installation and configuration practices to consider and implement. Each device may have unique capabilities and security options. Some practices to consider (with associated NIST SP 800-53 security controls in parentheses) include: 
Operation/Maintenance
Compromises to a device often occur while it is in the operation/maintenance phase. Outdated or unpatched software and firmware is a common vulnerability. Review vendor security bulletins or alerts on a regular basis and ensure appropriate personnel evaluate and install patches and upgrades as needed. Document a procedure and schedule for implementing updates/upgrades. 
Disposal
It is best to obtain an estimate from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) prior to acquisition on what the expected life of a RD is and how long they expect to support it (e.g., provide patches). Sanitize RDs when they are no longer needed by an organization or will be repurposed or stored by doing the following (with associated NIST SP 800-53 security controls in parentheses):
 Wipe/purge or destroy nonvolatile storage media (MP-6);
 Change or reset passwords and other authentication information, e.g., user pins (IA-5); and  Reset configurations to factory default settings (CM-6).
Service Contracts/Lease Agreements
The security considerations for acquiring a RD noted in previous sections also apply to leased devices. Furthermore, some additional considerations may apply and be included in service contracts/lease agreements as follows (with associated NIST SP 800-53 security controls in parentheses):
 Remove any nonvolatile storage from the device before the device can leave the organization for repair (MA-2, MA-5, MP-6);
 Sanitize nonvolatile storage before vendor technicians are allowed access to the device for maintenance (MA-2, MA-5, MP-6);
 Do not permit vendor technicians to remove organizational information (including passwords, configuration settings) in any form (MA-2, MA-5, MP-6); and  Escort and monitor vendor technicians to ensure that they do not violate contractual agreements and to monitor for potential change or removal of any information (including nonvolatile storage, passwords, network or configuration settings) (MA-2, MA-5).
Conclusion
It is important to understand risks before the acquisition of an RD. To manage risk for existing RDs that do not currently meet an organization's minimum security requirements, organizations consider replacement as soon as resources allow and in the interim, implement compensating controls (e.g., install a firewall for networked RDs that can't be patched/updated and/or don't provide encryption functionality, renegotiate the service contract or lease agreement, escort service technicians at all times).
The risks associated with owning and using RDs continually evolve. As technology, the operational environment, and an organization changes, the threats, vulnerabilities, potential impact and likelihood of an event may also change. Organizations assess their risk both when acquiring an RD, and on a regular basis thereafter to ensure the implementation of appropriate countermeasures or mitigation strategies.
